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Accountable advocacy, research and lobbying is important for just and 
robust policy-making and legislation. The recent report of the Public 
Administration Select Committee “Lobbying: Access and Influence in 
Whitehall” considers options for regulating lobbying public bodies in the 
United Kingdom. At the same time a public debate has begun on ways to 
curtail potential paid-for influencing of legislative processes in the House of 
Lords through individual members, the definition of appropriate sanctions, 
who could apply these, and how.  
To bolster standards of accountability amongst professional lobbyists, the 
Select Committee report identifies transparency and public utility as key 
principles to drive the definition of rules about lobbying and influencing 
Parliament. To achieve this, the Select Committee articulates the need for 
(1) a single umbrella group, that brings together on a voluntary basis all 
those who conduct lobbying activities in Parliament, and (2) a compulsory 
register of lobbying activities that allows public access and review of 
certain key information  
The Select Committee’s main recommendations seek to strike a balance 
between the freedom to approach and lobby public institutions, and the 
prevention of abuse by bringing inappropriate access and influence to 
light.  Research conducted and published by the One World Trust on 
accountability principles for think-tanks and other policy research 
organisations yields insights that may be helpful to close down gaps which 
remain in the Select Committee’s recommendations.   
On the basis of this research we argue in this briefing that: 
• Both multi-client professional political consultancies and non-profit 
organisations involved in lobbying should disclose their clients, most 
important donors and, if applicable, accurately describe scope and 
type of their claimed grassroots support; 
• all statistics and supporting evidence used in lobbying should be cited 
formally and made directly or upon request available to the public; and 
• an independent ombudsman should be created, whose function would 
be to supplement the powers of the umbrella group by offering a formal 
complaints handling and adjudication mechanism regarding 
irregularities in lobbying and other influences brought to bear on the 
legislative process, and who can advise parliamentary standards 
bodies on appropriate sanctions.  
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Accountability principles applied to lobbyists and campaigners 
The One World Trust has formulated an integrated conception of accountability which has 
been developed for global organisations1 and adapted to policy-relevant research 
organisations in our study of November 2008 “Accountability Principles for Research 
Organisations”2. In the course of the work, the One World Trust applies four core principles: 
transparency, participation, evaluation and complaints-handling. We focus in this paper on 
the principles of transparency and ask what that means for lobbyists in the United Kingdom. 
Together with the conclusions of the Public Administration Select Committee in their 5 
January 2009 report3, applying these principles will reduce the margin of opportunity for 
inappropriate lobbying activities by clarifying exactly the standards of ethics for lobbyists and 
ensuring that they are transparently adhered to by all lobbying and other special-interest 
groups. Furthermore, in the light of the still inconclusive reform of anti-corruption legislation in 
the UK4, the points explored in this paper may be helpful to find a way forward on other 
problematic practices involving the influencing of legislative processes, such as the recent 
“cash for legislation” allegations, which have visibly damaged the House of Lords’ reputation. 
Supplementing the register: transparency in data and stakeholders 
Research conducted by the One World Trust on the accountability of policy relevant research 
processes emphasises the importance of transparent relations between policy-makers and 
researchers for a robust policy process. It therefore concurs with the Select Committee’s 
conclusion that while a compulsory register of lobbyists may limit the ability of citizens to 
engage in Parliamentary affairs, and thus may impede an important aspect of democracy, 
introducing a register that requires information disclosure about lobbying activities will deter 
improper access and influence in Parliament.  
The Select Committee recommends two principles which inform the information to be 
included in the register: one states that the register should “include only information of 
genuine potential interest to the general public, to others who might wish to lobby 
government, and to decision makers themselves”, while the other is concerned with 
feasibility: “[the register] should include so far as possible information which is relatively 
straightforward to provide”. In addition to the application of these principles as outlined by the 
Select Committee, we would suggest that they support the inclusion of additional information 
to that recommended in the Select Committee’s paper – two of which we now address. 
Non-profits should be transparent too! 
We believe that there is a key gap in the proposed register. It captures five key pieces of 
information, of which three relate to the important question of the relationship between 
lobbyist and the public decision maker. The remaining two focus on the stakeholders of the 
lobbyist: first, the “names of individuals carrying out lobbying activity and of any organisation 
hiring them”; and second, “in the case of multi-client consultancies, the names of their 
clients.” 
 
1 See One World Trust (2005): Pathways to Accountability. The Global Accountability Framework, One World Trust, London 
2 Available at  
http://www.oneworldtrust.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=213&tmpl=component&format=raw&Itemid=
55 
3 House of Commons, Public Administration Select Committee, Lobbying: Access and influence in Whitehall, First Report of 
Session 2008-09, Volume 1, HC 36-I. 
4 The Draft Corruption Bill of 2003 and its legislative scrutiny involved significant discussions about parliamentary privilege and 
the use of parliamentary proceedings in Court. While no such privileges are proposed in the 2007 Bill [HL 126], the failure to 
conclude the process of legislation on this issue creates an unnecessary uncertainty for the appreciation of what constitutes the 
improper exercise of their function as members of both Houses in Parliament.  
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We argue that the requirement of naming clients and key stakeholders should go beyond 
simply multi-client consultancies, to include the disclosure of donors of non-profit 
organisations which engage in lobbying, including think-tanks and advocacy organisations. 
Lobbying is thus not the sole province of the professional political consultancy firms – the 
“lobbyists for hire”. Indeed, increasingly non-profits and single-interest groups are involved 
and influential in parliament, through provision of information and a variety of lobbying 
practices.5 Consider for example the case of the anti-obesity charity which lobbied parliament 
and accepted government funds as grants, but which also received substantial funds from a 
diet company.6 A list of their key donors contained in the register would ensure that possible 
conflicts of interests were brought to light. It would also reflect good practice rules within 
Parliament, such as the requirement that cross-party parliamentary groups both describe 
their purpose and disclose funding and other external support they may receive. 
There is no reason why non-profits and charities should be less transparent than the 
lobbying firms. Indeed, there is need for greater scrutiny since the accountability profile of the 
non-profit organisation is often more complicated than that of a multi-client firm, whose 
accountability is mainly balanced between the duties owed to a specific client and to the 
public decision-maker. The One World Trust’s research supports the conclusion that non-
profit advocacy organisations run the risk of being torn between accountability to three 
potentially conflicting external stakeholder groups: (1) the constituencies on whose behalf 
they claim to work and are lobbying (their ‘grassroots’), (2) their donors and (3) the decision 
makers whom they are seeking to convince.  
Non-profits should therefore be transparent not only about their donors but also their 
grassroots support. We propose that information on both of these key stakeholders is put in 
the register. The Select Committee Report also isolates the danger of so-called astro-turfing, 
i.e. “fake” claims to have grass-roots support, yet no information about these stakeholders is 
captured by the proposed register. While we do not think that it would be appropriate to 
reveal specifics about individuals, we think claims to grassroots support should specify 
numbers of members – perhaps broken down by location – which should be subject to 
challenge. 
Produce evidence used to support lobbying activities 
The minutes and written evidence provided to the Select Committee rightly emphasise the 
value of lobbying as a means to collect information. Policy should be based on evidence, and 
lobbying is one important means for evidence to be brought to the attention of the decision 
makers. Not only is the democratic principle served by allowing all elements of society to 
engage in lobbying activities, but the policy ‘output’ will also be improved.  
We therefore argue that the register should include full citations and if possible 
documentation of any evidence used to support lobbying activities. The inclusion of such 
supporting evidence meets both the principle of transparency, and that of public utility as 
identified by the Select Committee. Not only is this information a core element of evidence-
based policy-making - it is also relatively straightforward to provide. The register already 
demands that minutes be taken, and this additional specification would thus not be onerous. 
We suggest that the additional information to be provided should for instance include 
statistics used to support the case, together where possible with citations referring the reader 
to the full data-sets and supporting analyses. To facilitate this we recommend that the 
electronic and web accessible register includes a function for uploading and viewing relevant 
 
5 Dr Phil Parvin, Friend or foe: Lobbying in the British Parliament (2007) The Hansard Society: London. 
6 The Independent on Sunday, Michael Gillard, 20 January 2008. 
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documents. Again, this builds on existing good practices within Parliament for the disclosure 
of full evidence given for instance in public hearings during legislative scrutiny processes. 
Opponents to this suggestion may argue that some data is confidential or should not be 
available for other reasons. We would counter such arguments with the assertion that, 
insofar as an argument is being made to a public body that is seeking to make a decision 
which will affect the public, a strong presumption exists that in the interest of transparent 
policy-making such arguments should be supported by information that is publically 
available. 
At the same time, our research on information disclosure and complaints handling in global 
organisations shows that not in all cases consensus will be achievable on issues of 
disclosure and the good practice to follow. First the boundaries between practices of 
information sharing, lobbying and influencing of legislative processes are to some extent 
fluid, and second in a competitive environment there may be commercial and political 
incentives to keep some information back, against the understanding of good practice by 
others. This brings us to our second set of recommendations – that there should be an 
ombudsman to whom complaints may be brought.  
Adding bite: an independent ombudsman  
At present, lobbying is more stringently regulated from the side of the lobbied – the activities 
of Government and the Houses of Parliament (see paragraph 67 of the PASC Report) – than 
it is from the side of the lobbyists. Public affairs agencies and lobbyists themselves are only 
self-regulated through three umbrella groups – the Association of Professional Political 
Consultants (APPC), the Public Relations Consultants Association (PRCA) and the 
Chartered Institute of Public Relations (CIPR – which alone of the three has a membership 
comprised of individuals). The Select Committee argues that since “[l]obbyists do not want 
their competitors to know the detail of how they go about their business…external coercion 
will be required” (para 43). Self-regulation, the Report argues, has in fact “led to very little 
regulation of any substance” (para 66). 
Conversely, we take seriously the argument that too strict regulation will impair access to the 
Government and to the Parliament, and thus may impede the democratic principles which 
were brought up during oral evidence to the Committee7. Constraints on approaching public 
bodies should be limited. We therefore agree that there cannot be a compulsory member 
group for lobbyists. Yet the creation of a single umbrella group, for whom membership will be 
voluntary (para 145), will help to harmonise understandings of accountability requirements 
and the definition of good practice for self-regulation.  
We remain concerned, however, that the reputation aspect may not be sufficient to provide 
incentives for membership of the organisation. Since regulation is a question of a business 
culture (which is notoriously difficult to change by top-down regulation) we question whether 
the business culture would change by virtue of a piece of regulation sufficiently and quickly 
enough to impel organisations and individuals to enrol. Moreover, there would inevitably be a 
number of organisations – those non-profits and corporations’ in-house lobbying teams – 
who may not consider themselves lobbyists, hence not become members and fall outside the 
umbrella group’s self-regulatory powers. 
Since compulsory registration in the umbrella group is not an appropriate option for reasons 
of public access to public institutions, we instead argue that an independent ombudsman 
should be created who will be given the power to accept complaints about improper lobbying 
activities by anyone approaching Parliament, including non-members of the umbrella group. 
 
7 House of Commons, Public Administration Select Committee, Lobbying: Access and Influence in Whitehall, First Report of 
Session 2008-09, Vol. II Oral and Written Evidence, HC 36-I, 5 January 2009, e.g. Ev 3. 
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Since the ombudsman’s powers would be exercised over those lobbying Parliament, it would 
not interfere with the possibility of citizens to approach Whitehall, and yet at the same time it 
would bolster the transparency and accountability of lobbying. Complaints would also be 
acceptable over the content of the register, which we are concerned would remain un-
policed. The remit of the ombudsman would include challenges brought to information 
included in the register – and could ask, for example, for an organisation to substantiate 
claims as to grassroots support.  
Conclusion and summary of recommendations 
Accountable advocacy, research and lobbying is important for just and robust policy-making 
and legislative processes. Yet the current very open and largely unregulated practice of 
lobbying and access to Parliament involves challenges for realising transparency in the 
public policy and legislative process in terms of evidence that is brought to bear on the 
process, by whom, and on whose behalf. Knowledge of and public access to this information 
is critical to the integrity of Parliament and the important work its members do.  
This paper builds on research conducted by the One World Trust on the accountability of 
policy oriented research, parliamentary oversight of policy processes and the accountability 
of global organisation. On this basis it seeks to complement the conclusions reached in a 
recent January 2009 report of the Public Administration Select Committee on “Lobbying: 
Access and Influence in Whitehall”. Key issues raised in this paper may also be helpful to 
address the challenges that have emerged from the recent ‘cash for legislation’ allegations 
against some members of the House of Lords, and provide a further incentive for Parliament 
to progress with work on the Corruption Bill. 
To address specifically the issue of regulating lobbying in Parliament, the One World Trust’s 
research leads to the following recommendations: 
• An independent ombudsman should be appointed who would have formal powers to 
process and investigate challenges and complaints brought before him/her, whether it 
be about information entered in the register or the conduct of lobbying, or other 
influences brought to bear on the legislative process, to adjudicate, and as a last 
resort recommend further investigation and sanctions by appropriate bodies. 
• The register of lobbying activities proposed by the Select Committee should not be 
limited to activities conducted by multi-client consultancies but should also capture 
lobbying by the broader range of organisations and individuals involved in it such as 
non profits. Further, it should include information about the clients and, where 
applicable key donors, scope and type of claimed grassroots support.  
• Lobbyists should include in the register the evidence they propose in support of their 
case, including statistics and citations produced in the course of their lobbying 
activities. Public access to these sources is vital for a transparent policy-formulation 
process. 
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